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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2472 
 ___________ 
 
 MICHAEL PERRY, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DOC);  SECRETARY 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SHARON BURKES, 
Secretary of Corrections; DORINA VARNER, Chief Grievance Officer, (DOC); 
MARTIN DRAGOVICH, Superintendent S.C.I. Chester; PAUL STOWITSKY, 
Superintendent SRCF Mercer; M. W. HARLOW, Superintendent SRCF Mercer; DAWN 
CHAMBERLAIN, Superintendent, SCI Pittsburgh; ROBERT SUNSHINE, Deputy SCI 
Chester; DEB SAUERS, Deputy SCI Pittsburgh; MR. JACKSON, Unit Manager SCI 
Chester; P. MICHAEL BIVINS, Unit Manager SCI Chester; WILLIAM WOODS, Unit 
Manager SRCF Mercer; WAYNE EMERICK, Unit Manager SCI Pittsburgh; ARTHUR 
ROTHWELL, Counselor SCI Chester; MS. KIMMEL, Counselor SRCF Mercer; 
GEORGE MESAROS, Counselor SRCF Mercer; MACHINAK, Counselor SCI 
Pittsburgh; LISA FOUST, Counselor SCI Mercer; MR. FOY, Corrections Officer SRCF 
Mercer; MR. STEINDURF, Corrections Officer SRCF Mercer 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00386) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 28, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 11, 2011 ) 
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 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Perry, a prisoner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania proceeding pro 
se and in forma pauperis, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint.  We will 
affirm. 
 Perry filed suit on March 22, 2010, alleging that the defendants, all employees of 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (―DOC‖), violated his civil rights.  
Convicted in 1996 of various sexual offenses, for which he received a ten-to-twenty-year 
sentence, Perry describes himself as a model prisoner, voluntarily participating in therapy 
and ―actively seeking those activities that would aid in his rehabilitation and release.‖  
Compl. ¶¶ 21–23, ECF No. 1.  Yet despite these efforts, Perry was made aware that his 
status as a sex offender would complicate obtaining parole; in 2006, for example, he was 
told by a program manager that he was ―not going to get paroled anyway.‖  Compl. ¶ 24.   
 Perry completed his ten-year minimum while incarcerated at SCI Chester, but 
despite his good behavior, he was not given a positive parole recommendation by the 
DOC.  He wrote to defendant Dragovich, the Superintendent of the prison, to ask what 
steps he could take to secure the recommendation in the future.  He was informed that, 
among other factors, the nature of his crime and his ―condescending attitude‖ had 
weighed against a positive recommendation.  Compl. ¶ 32.  Perry filed a grievance, and 
was told in the resulting series of responses (from defendants Bivens, Sunshine, and 
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Burks respectively) that he needed more therapy, had no right to demand parole at his 
minimum date, and struggled with as-yet ―unresolved issues,‖ such as an inability to 
discuss his crimes.  Compl. ¶¶ 35–37.  His parole was denied on March 24, 2006. 
 Following transfers to SCI Mercer and SCI Pittsburgh, the pattern would repeat: 
Perry would receive a negative recommendation from the DOC based on his original 
offense and his status as a sex offender, with parole being denied both for those reasons 
and due to a stated need for more ―therapy.‖  Perry’s complaint suggested that he was 
actually being denied parole almost entirely due to the nature of his original offense, and 
that his attempts to discern exactly what was expected of him in order to obtain a 
favorable parole recommendation—what additional programs he needed to complete, 
what behavior he needed to modify—were met with insults, derision, and retaliation.  
Upon being informed in March 2009 that his fourth parole application had not drawn a 
positive recommendation from the DOC, Perry filed a grievance, requesting such a 
recommendation based on his good prison conduct and compliance with required sex-
offender programs.  Compl. ¶ 73.  He was told that staff did not unanimously support his 
release and that he had unresolved ―ongoing treatment needs,‖ as well as a serious 
criminal history.  Compl. ¶¶ 72–78.  The responses also accused him of arrogance, 
condescension, remorselessness, and entitlement; the responses were then forwarded to 
the parole board (―Board‖).  See Mem. of Law 12, ECF No. 41.  Perry’s fourth parole 
application, like its predecessors, was denied. 
 Perry argued that the defendants’ actions, which he described as ―malicious‖ and 
―deliberate,‖ violated his right to procedural and substantive due process, by arbitrarily 
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denying him a fair hearing in front of the Board, causing the Board to consider factors 
that should not have considered, and refusing to specify what type of therapy and 
additional programming would yield a positive recommendation.  He partly based his 
claims on his assertion that the defendants violated state law and DOC policy.  Perry 
separately alleged that the forwarding of his grievance responses to the Board constituted 
illegal retaliation, and claimed that the defendants had violated his right to equal 
protection.  He requested several kinds of injunctive relief, including the removal of 
negative information from his files and a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the 
DOC’s voting procedure; he also asked for damages.1  
 The defendants moved to dismiss, denying, inter alia, that the complained-of 
conduct stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court
2
 concurred.  See 
generally Perry v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10-386, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55268 (W.D. 
Pa. May 24, 2011).  Perry filed a timely notice of appeal.  
 We must first determine whether the aspects of the suit addressing parole are 
properly cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
3
 as challenges to parole decisions are 
                                                 
1
 To the extent that Perry requested damages from the various state officials acting in 
their official capacities, his claims were barred by sovereign immunity.  Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  But claims requesting prospective 
injunctive relief from official-capacity defendants do not run afoul of sovereign 
immunity.  See Iles v. De Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 
2
 The parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge.  See ECF 
Nos. 8, 13; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  
 
3
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s order 
granting dismissal is plenary, and we accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint 
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frequently in the exclusive domain of habeas corpus.  See, e.g., Coady v. Vaughn, 251 
F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the appellant was required to challenge the 
execution of his sentence, inclusive of an adverse denial of parole by the Pennsylvania 
Board, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).  Guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkinson 
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), we believe that the entire complaint passes muster as a 
civil rights action.  Perry does not ask that he be granted parole, nor does he demand an 
injunction allowing for speedier release into the community; rather, he simply requests 
that the inappropriate information used to influence the DOC’s recommendation be 
purged from his files, that he be allowed to ―fact-check‖ the information for accuracy, 
that he be provided with information regarding the amount of therapy needed to qualify 
for parole (with the option of ―[s]pecify[ing] treatment needs and goals‖ to that end), and 
that the DOC be forced to comply with its own regulations in granting parole 
recommendations.  See Compl. ¶¶ 90–92,  102–03.  Success in any of these dimensions 
would not ―necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.‖  
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82.  Rather, it would mean ―at most [a] new eligibility review‖ or 
the possibility that, in a future ―parole hearing[,] . . . parole authorities may, in their 
discretion . . . shorten [Perry’s] prison term.‖  Id.; see also Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 
677 (3d Cir. 2010).   
In order to state a substantive due process claim, Perry must plead actions by the 
executive officials so abhorrent as to ―shock the conscience.‖  See Evans v. Sec’y Pa. 
                                                                                                                                                             
as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in Perry’s favor.  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of 
N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  
 
 6 
 
Dep’t of Corr., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9905, at *25 (3d Cir. Pa. May 16, 
2011, No. 09-2657).  While that standard ―has some give in it,‖ id. at *26, it does not 
―impos[e] liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm‖; rather, 
―conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the 
sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.‖  Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1998) (emphasis added).   
Perry does not distinguish in his complaint between conduct challenged under 
procedural due process and conduct challenged under substantive due process.  Reading 
his allegations liberally,
4
 we do not believe that any of the behavior alleged meets the 
exacting standard of substantive due process.  Neither an inability to articulate exact 
counseling requirements for a parole recommendation nor the alleged contravention of 
DOC procedures, on such a small scale, serves to shock the conscience.  Moreover, Perry 
does not allege that the Board could not have denied parole in the absence of the 
information to which he objects.  Nor does he aver that there existed no legitimate 
government interest in recommending against granting him parole.  
 Perry also claims that the defendants constructively denied him a fair hearing in 
front of the Board, thereby violating his procedural due process rights.  ―A protected 
liberty interest may arise from only one of two sources: the Due Process Clause or the 
laws of a state.‖  Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).  It is well 
settled that the United States Constitution does not itself establish a liberty interest in 
                                                 
4
 See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).  
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parole.  Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 783 (3d Cir. 2010).  Pennsylvania case law 
strongly suggests that that no state-created liberty interest accrues in parole until parole is 
actually granted.
5
  Nieves v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 995 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2010); see also Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 325 (Pa. 1999) 
(―Our courts have consistently found that the Parole Act does not create a liberty interest 
in parole.  . . . Rather, parole is a matter of grace and mercy shown to a prisoner who has 
demonstrated,  to the Board’s satisfaction, his ability to function as a law-abiding 
citizen.‖).  With no liberty interest at stake, no process was required; regardless, if due 
process were required, we find that the recommendations to which Perry objects did not 
deny him such.  See Newman, 617 F.3d at 783.
6
 
                                                 
5
 Perry argues that a Pennsylvania statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9718.1, creates a liberty 
interest in receiving sex-offender treatment, to the extent that the treatment is a 
prerequisite for parole.  See Arg. in Supp. of Appeal of Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. to 
Dismiss 2 (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 544 (3d Cir. 2002)).  That statute, 
greatly distilled, requires those convicted of certain enumerated offenses to participate in 
sex-offender treatment in order to be eligible for parole.  To the extent that the statute 
applies to Perry, see Act effective Dec. 20, 2000, 2000 Pa. Laws 98, § 3 (applying section 
9718.1 to offenses committed on or after the effective date of the act), any liberty interest 
it might convey would be quite narrow, limited to the right to pursue such treatment if it 
is indeed required for parole.  While Perry does describe some impediments in seeking 
the required treatment, successful completion of that treatment would not guarantee 
parole under the statute, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat § 9718.1(d)(3).  Nor does anything in the 
law prevent either the Board or DOC employees from determining that a prisoner needs 
additional treatment.  In sum, the statute nowhere guarantees a clear and static path from 
treatment to eventual parole.   
 
6
 Perry asserts in his complaint that Pennsylvania law ―do[es] not permit the Parole Board 
to consider the recommendations of prison officials concerning an inmate’s parole.‖  
Compl. ¶ 85, ECF No. 1.  His reading of the statute in question (the version of 61 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 331.19 in effect at the time of his parole decisions) does not appear to find 
support in Pennsylvania case law.  See, e.g., Evans v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 820 
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 Perry further alleges that the defendants violated his Equal Protection rights.  He 
does not plead membership in a protected class, nor does he identify similarly situated 
inmates who were treated differently than he; in fact, as the District Court noted, he 
suggested that the ―aberrant‖ treatment he received was actually quite common.  Perry 
therefore cannot successfully raise a ―class of one‖ Equal Protection claim, to the extent 
that such a theory would be appropriate in this context.  See Vill. of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 
603 (2008) (observing, in dicta, that state action involving ―discretionary decisionmaking 
based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments‖ does not violate Equal 
Protection ―when one person is treated differently from others, because treating like 
individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted‖).  
 Perry further claims that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances 
by ―enter[ing] the[ir] accusations into [his] file and forward[ing] them to the Parole 
Board intending to prevent Plaintiff’s parole.‖  Compl. ¶ 106.  He maintains that this 
                                                                                                                                                             
A.2d 904, 907 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); McGarry v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 819 A.2d 
1211, 1213 n.3, 1216 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).   
 
Indeed, we read the statute to sweep quite broadly.  For one, it contains a catch-all 
provision: the Board may consider ―the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if 
any, together with such additional information regarding the nature and circumstances of 
the offense committed for which sentence was imposed as may be available.‖  61 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 331.19.  Also, while Perry complains that the DOC impermissibly included 
its views on his underlying offense in its recommendation, he does not deny that the 
Board is required to ―consider the nature and circumstances of the offense committed.‖  
Id.  Thus, to the extent that Perry complains that the individual pieces of information 
contained in the DOC report would not have otherwise been available to the Board, he 
cannot show prejudice stemming from any alleged violation of procedure.  See Wilson v. 
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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retaliation caused him to ―refrain[] from filing formal grievances in the hopes of getting 
effective and meaningful parole consideration in the future.‖  Compl. ¶ 109.  In his 
response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Perry clarified that this retaliation 
consisted of accusations of being ―arrogant, condescending, unremorseful, entitled, and 
needing more therapy‖ in grievance responses, which were then forwarded to the Board.  
See Mem. of Law 12, ECF No. 41.  First, as observed by the District Court, these 
responses would have followed in time the DOC’s decision to not recommend him for 
parole, as Perry began pursuing his final set of grievances when he learned that he did not 
receive the DOC’s recommendation; in other words, the Board already knew of the 
DOC’s ambivalence toward Perry’s parole application.  See Compl. ¶¶ 73–81.  Second, 
and taking the facts alleged as true, we conclude that forwarding these grievance 
responses, containing sentiment already known to both Perry and the Board, would not 
dissuade a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to pursue administrative 
remedies.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 Finally, Perry appears to stake a constitutional claim on the defendants’ actions 
that allegedly violated state law and policy.  ―[B]y its terms, [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 provides 
a remedy for violations of federal, not state or local, law.‖  McMullen v. Maple Shade 
Twp., 643 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2011).  Hence, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we find no substantial question to be presented by this 
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appeal.
7
  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 
Murray v. Bledsoe, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11702, at *3 (3d Cir. June 10, 
2011, No. 10-4397); see also Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 We also hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to offer Perry 
leave to amend his complaint.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2002).   
